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In the United States, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA" or
"Act") is the sole basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction in civil actions
against foreign states The FSIA grants sovereign immunity to foreign
states from suits in United States courts unless they fall under one of the
exceptions to the Act. Included in the definition of a foreign state under the
Act is "an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state."2 This definition of
an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state encompasses foreign gov-
ernment-owned corporations ("FGOC"), a corporation of whose shares or
ownership interest is owned by a foreign state's government or political
subdivision.
Sovereign immunity is a principle in international law under which
domestic courts must refrain from exercising jurisdiction against a foreign
state Sovereign immunity is normally thought of as applying against the
state itself, but under the FSIA, a corporation owned by the government can
* J.D. Candidate, May 2000, Northwestern University School of Law.
128 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976) [hereinafter "FSIA" or "the Act"]; see also Argentine Repub-
lic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989).21d. at § 1603(b).
3Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings H.R. 11315 Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on Ju-
diciary, 94th Congress, 2d 25 (1976) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Monroe Leigh,
Legal Advisor, Department of State).
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also claim sovereign immunity from suit. Imagine a scenario where a U.S.
business is engaged in a transaction with a foreign corporation whose shares
are 90 percent owned by the government of the foreign state. If a breach of
contract occurs, the U.S. suit would be initially barred from federal court
unless the plaintiff can prove that one of the exceptions to the FSIA applies.
The FSIA creates a presumption that a FGOC is engaged in sovereign ac-
tivity and the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to establish an exception to
the FSIA.
The Commercial Activities Exception is the most frequently invoked
exception by plaintiffs. The exception allows a court to lift the sovereign
immunity of the FGOC and exert subject matter jurisdiction over the defen-
dant. This paper examines the commercial activities exception as applied to
a FGOC. Specifically, this article will argue that even though subject mat-
ter jurisdiction is relatively easy to obtain over FGOCs under this excep-
tion, the FSIA should be changed so that the definition of a foreign state in
the FSIA no longer includes FGOCs.
First, this article will examine the way courts have dealt with suits
against FGOCs claiming immunity under the FSIA. Second, this article
will argue that obtaining jurisdiction over a FGOC has become relatively
easy under the FSIA due to the way courts have applied the commercial ac-
tivities exception in recent decisions. Third, this article will suggest meth-
ods for United States and foreign businesses to avoid difficulties in
obtaining jurisdiction over FGOCs. Finally, this article will advocate that
FGOCs should no longer be provided sovereign immunity under U.S. law.
Part II provides a brief introduction into the history of the FSIA. Part
I looks at how FGOCs are defined as "foreign states" under the FSIA.
Part IV looks at the commercial activities exception to the FSIA. Part V
examines recent decisions of the application of the commercial activities
exception to FGOCs and the effect it has for jurisdiction in U.S. Courts.
Part VI demonstrates the negative effects the FSIA has for U.S. businesses
in their business transactions. Finally, Part VII advocates the elimination of
FGOCs from the definition of a foreign state. FGOCs should be discarded
from the FSIA because of the ease of obtaining jurisdiction over an FGOC,
the problems it causes for U.S. businesses in doing transactions, and its in-
consistency with the basic rationale of the FSIA.
I1. SHORT HISTORY OF THE FSIA
A. Absolute Immunity
The theory of absolute immunity for foreign sovereigns provides that
"a state enjoys complete immunity from the adjudicatory jurisdiction of
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other states."' Its application in U.S. courts is generally traced to The
Schooner Exchange v. McFadden.5 In The Schooner Exchange, Chief Jus-
tice Marshall stated that the "jurisdiction of (a) nation within its own terri-
tory, is necessarily exclusive and absolute; it is susceptible of no limitation,
not imposed by itself."6 Courts and scholars have agreed that The Schooner
Exchange established the principle of absolute sovereign immunity.7 Dur-
ing the first fifty years of the twentieth century, the absolute theory came
under increasing attack from both American and British commentators be-
cause of the broad scope of immunity. In 1952, the United States adopted
another theory of sovereign immunity -- the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity.8
B. Restrictive Immunity
The restrictive theory of sovereign immunity differs from the absolute
theory by recognizing that governments often act in a commercial rather
than a governmental capacity. Theoretically, when a government acts in a
commercial capacity, a foreign government should stand in the same posi-
tion as that of any other commercial actor in the international marketplace. 9
In 1952, the Tate Letter formally announced the U.S. State Department's
adoption of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity with respect to pri-
vate acts of foreign governments.1°
By enacting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Congress
codified the doctrine of restrictive sovereign immunity." Restrictive sover-
eign immunity under the FSIA holds that the immunity of the sovereign is
recognized with respect to sovereign or public acts but not with respect to
private acts.12 The FSIA was intended to ensure the application of the doc-
trine of restrictive sovereign immunity in litigation before U.S. courts but
Congress also intended to restrict any immunity when foreign states en-
4 Joan E. Donoghue, Taking the "Sovereign" Out of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act: A Functional Approach to the Commercial Activity Exception, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 489,
490(1992).5The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
61d. at 136.7David E. Gohlke, Clearing the Air or Muddying the Waters? Defining a "Direct effect
in the United States" under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act After Republic of Argen-
tina v. Weltover, 18 Hous. J. INT'L. L. 261 (1995).
SHearings, supra note 3, at 26.
91d. at 30 (testimony of Bruno A. Ristau, Chief, Foreign Litigation Section, Civil Divi-
sion, Department of Justice).
'Old. at 54.
t H.R. RE'. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976).
"Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, Department of State, to Philip B.
Pernman, Acting Attorney General (May 19', 1952), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of London
v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
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gaged in commercial activities. 13 Before passage of the Act, FGOCs were
treated as private entities and denied sovereign immunity unless they could
show that their activities were of a strictly public nature.' 4 The conse-
quence of enacting the FSIA on FGOCs is that FGOCs are afforded all the
immunities enjoyed by a foreign sovereign unless one of the exceptions to
the FSIA can be met.
C. International Practice
The United States is the only country in the world that has adopted
state ownership of an entity as a basis for conferring sovereign immunity.
Since 1976, most countries that have enacted legislation codifying the re-
strictive theory have expressly rejected the idea.'5 None of the international
law organizations that have published draft conventions codifying the re-
strictive theory have based foreign sovereign status on ownership. 6 Thus,
although the FSIA's first objective is international alignment, the failure of
FSIA in this regard is apparent. While the commercial activities exception
was intended to align the United States with the restrictive theory, as dis-
cussed in Part VII, the initial grant of sovereign immunity to FGOCs is
where the major problem lies. In fact, the FSIA runs contrary to the very
purpose of restrictive sovereign immunity. The public commercial sector
has diversified so widely that most state-owned corporations are engaged in
commercial activities. Thus, conferring foreign state status on FGOCs un-
dermines the restrictive theory and the goal of the FSIA.
III. FOREIGN GOVERNMENT-OWNED CORPORATIONS UNDER THE FSIA
The FSIA provides sovereign immunity to foreign government-owned
corporations under Section 1603 of the Act.17 Nowhere in the Act are
FGOCs specifically mentioned. However, under Section 1603(a), a foreign
state is defined to include "a political subdivision of a foreign state or an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state." An agency or instrumentality
13H.R. Rep. No. 1487, supra note 10.
14See Oliver American Trading Co. v. United States of Mex., 5 F.2d 659, 665 (2d Cir.
1924) (holding that the Mexican railroad enjoyed sovereign immunity on the basis that in
Mexico running a railroad was strictly a public function); Danny Abir, Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act: The Right to Jury Trial in Suits against foreign government-owned corpora-
tions, 32 STAN. L. INT'L L. 159 (1996).
15William C. Hoffman, The Separate Entity Rule in International Perspective: Should
State Ownership of Corporate Shares Confer Sovereign Status For Immunity Purposes?, 65
TUL. L. REv. 535, 565-66 (1991).
16See United Nations: International Law Commission Draft Articles on Jurisdictional
Immunities of States and Their Property, 26 I.L.M. 292 (1983); International Law Associa-
tion: Draft Articles for a Convention on State Immunity, 22 I.L.M. 287 (1983).
'728 U.S.C. §1603 (1976).
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is further defined in subsection 1603(b), where a FGOC would be included
under the FSIA.'
Section 1603(b) provides three requirements that an entity must meet
before it falls under the definition of an agency or instrumentality of a for-
eign state: (1) the entity must be a separate legal person, (2) the entity must
be an organ of a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof, or a major-
ity of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state
or political subdivision thereof, and (3) the entity must not be a citizen of
the United States nor created under the laws of any third country. 19 Section
1603(b) is the immunity defense of any state-owned organization. In any
case with a FGOC, the key to immunity, and thus to the absence of subject
matter jurisdiction and to dismissal, is to show that the entity falls within
the Section 1603(b) definition of "agency or instrumentality" and thus
should be treated as a "foreign state".
In the House Report accompanying the FSIA, Congress explained the
definition of "agency or instrumentality" was "intended to include a corpo-
ration, association, foundation, or any other entity which, under the law of
the foreign state where it was created, can sue or be sued in its own name,
contract in its own name or hold property in its own name."20 These enti-
ties can be in a variety of forms including a transport organization such as a
shipping line, airline, steel company, foreign bank, state trading corpora-
tion, or an export association.2 ' By including FGOCs into the definition of
a foreign state, Congress granted the same immunities that it provided to
foreign governments to a corporation.
Generally, it is easy for a U.S. court to determine whether a FGOC
meets the definition of a foreign state under Section 1603. This is because
most FGOCs are owned by one state government which owns more than 50
percent of the shares of that corporation. The difficulty arises when the
FGOC is owned by several foreign governments or when the foreign gov-
ernment does not directly own the corporation but rather one of its agencies
or instrumentalities is involved in the chain of ownership. The federal
courts have deemed these two situations as pooling and tiering respectively.
Although there remains a split in the circuits over the latter issue, a large
number of courts have stretched far under these two doctrines to encompass
FGOCs under the definition of a foreign state.
A. Pooling of Ownership Interests
Most federal courts have allowed several states to "pool" together their
ownership interests in a corporation to foster a majority of ownership for
181d.
19 Id.20H. R. Rep., supra note 11, at 15.
211d. at 15-16.
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that corporation.22 Although the FSIA does not expressly allow pooling,
most courts do permit it though they do not typically explain how pooling
affects the purposes of the FSIA.2 3
In In re Aircraft Disaster near Roselawn, Indiana, the Seventh Circuit
found that the ownership interests of France and Italy in an aircraft manu-
facturer named Avions de Transport Regional, G.I.E. ("ATR") may be
pooled under the FSIA to establish ATR as a foreign state under the FSIA.24
The Court noted that in almost all cases, pooling of several states with own-
ership interests in a corporation has been allowed under the FSIA.25 In Le-
Donne v. Gulf Air, the court allowed a treaty-created airline owned by four
Persian Gulf states to pool its ownership interests to meet the FSIA's ma-
jority-ownership provisions
26
In Credit Lyonnais v. Getty Square Associates, the district court al-
lowed France to pool its ownership interests together to form a 57.17 per-
cent ownership in Credit Lyonnais where France owned 48.5 percent of
Credit Lyonais outstanding shares and in addition, owned 99.97 percent of
SPBI SNC, another French Corporation which in turn owned 8.675 percent
of Credit Lyonnais.27 The court held that if several states could pool their
ownership interests together, then one state could pool its own ownership
interest through more than one agency or instrumentality so that the entity
may be defined as a "foreign state" under Section 1603(b)(2). 8
The effect of allowing pooling of ownership interests is to provide an
easy method for FGOCs to be deemed an agency of a foreign state under
the FSIA and to receive the protections of sovereign immunity. The result
of pooling for the purposes of the FSIA is that it broadens the scope of sov-
ereign immunity because an entity may receive immunity even though it is
owned by many sovereigns.
22See, e.g., Mangattu v. MV EBN Hayyan, 35 F.3d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that
entity 100 percent owned by foreign states and created by agreement of all participating
states satisfied "majority" requirement; FSIA does not require that majority interest be
owned by a single foreign state).
23See In re Air Craft Disaster near Roselawn, Indiana on October 31, 1994, 96 F.3d 932,
929 (7th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter In re Aircraft]. But see Gardiner Stone v. Iberia Lineas Ae-
reas de Espana, 896 F. Supp. 125, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that pooling was not al-
lowed by Spain and Argentina since the corporation was not created by treaty or by a
multinational joint venture); Linton v. Airbus Industrie, 794 F.Supp. 650, 652 (S.D. Tex.
1992) ("[I]t is far from clear that pooling is allowed under FSIA.").24See In re Air Crash, 96 F.3d at 939.
25 rd.
26 See LeDonne v. Gulf Air, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 1400, 1406 (E.D. Va. 1988); see also Jo-
seph W. Hardy Jr., Wipe Away the Tiers: Determining Agency or Instrumentality Status un-
der the Foreign Sovereign ImmunitiesAct, 31 GA. L. REv. 1121 (1997).
27Credit Lyonnais v. Getty Square Associates, 876 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).28Id. at 520.
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B. Tiering of Ownership Interests
Tiering of ownership interests under the FSIA allows classifying an
entity as an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state when the entity is
not directly owned by any foreign government. There is a split in the cir-
cuits over whether tiering should be allowed under the FSIA for FGOCs.
In In re Aircraft Disaster near Roselawn, Indiana, the Seventh Circuit
held that France and Italy may "tier" their ownership interests through cor-
porate intermediaries SNIA and Alenia and still fall within the definition of
a foreign state under the FSIA.29 Thus, the Seventh Circuit decision would
allow an infinite loop of ownership where corporations owned by agencies
or instrumentalities of foreign states themselves become a "foreign state"
under the Act and any subsequent majority-owned corporation would also
fall within the Act.
30
This reasoning was rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Gates v. Victor
Finer Foods, Inc., where the court held that Fletcher Finer Foods (TFF"),
which was 100 percent owned by Alberta Pork, an agency or instrumental-
ity of a foreign state (Canada), was not a "foreign state" itself under the
FSIA.3 1 The court stated that to add to the list of entities that are owned by
an agency or instrumentality would expand the potential immunity for
every subsidiary in a corporate chain, no matter how far down the line.32
The district court in Hyatt Corp. v. Stanton agreed with the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Gates, but a large number of other courts have rejected this de-
cision.
33
Thus, with a combination of pooling and tiering along with direct ma-
jority ownership of a corporation, a majority of the FGOCs that are sued in
U.S. courts have the option of invoking sovereign immunity under the FSIA
since they can easily fall under the definition of a foreign state. Courts have
interpreted the "majority ownership" provisions in Section 1603(b) liberally
to encompass different scenarios of ownership. The effect is that the bur-
den then shifts to the plaintiff to prove an exception to the grant of sover-
eign immunity in order for the suit to continue.
IV. THE COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES EXCEPTION
Under the FSIA, a court can only assert jurisdiction over a sovereign
state when that state action comes under one of the enumerated exceptions
to the FSIA. The most frequently invoked exception is the commercial ac-
tivities exception.
291n Re Aircraft, 96 F.3d at 939.
30id.
31 Gates v. Victor Fine Foods, 54 F.3d 1457, 1466 (9th Cir. 1995).
32 1d. at 1463.
33Hyatt Corp. v. Stanton, 945 F. Supp. 675, 686-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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Section 1605(a)(2) provides that a foreign state shall not be immune
from the jurisdiction of a U.S. court
"in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried out in
the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of a foreign state
elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in con-
nection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that
act causes a direct effect in the United States.,
34
This section is collectively known as the commercial activities excep-
tion and the Supreme Court has referred to Section 1605(a)(2) as "(t)he
most significant of the FSIA's exceptions. 35
There are three parts to the commercial activities exception. The first
clause deals with a commercial activity in the United States, the second
clause deals with an act in the United States in connection with a commer-
cial activity in a foreign country, and the third clause deals with both acts
and commercial activities outside the U.S.
A. Definition of Commercial Activity
Section 1603(d) of the FSIA defines a commercial activity:
"A commercial activity means either a regular course of commercial con-
duct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial character of
an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of con-
duct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose."
36
In Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, the Supreme Court defined a
commercial activity by establishing a "private person" test.37 The Court
held that "when a foreign government acts, not as a regulator of a market,
but in the manner of a private player within it, the foreign sovereign's ac-
tions are "commercial" within the meaning of the FSIA.' 8 The Court also
explained that the determination of a commercial activity must be made by
reference to its nature and not its purpose, according to the Act, by looking
at "whether the particular actions that the foreign state performs (whatever
the motive behind them) are the types of actions by which a private party
engages in "trade and traffic or commerce".39 The Court then provided an
example:
"[A] foreign government's issuance of regulations limiting foreign cur-
rency exchange is a sovereign activity, because such authoritative control of
commerce cannot be exercised by a private party; whereas a contract to buy
3428 U.S.C. §1605(a)(2).
35Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 611 (1992).
3628 U.S.C.§ 1603(d).
37Weltover, supra note 35.




army boots or even bullets is a 'commercial activity' because private compa-
nies can similarly use sales contracts to acquire goods."40
Thus, the court in Weltover held that the issuance of bonds by Argen-
tina was a commercial activity since private parties can easily issue bonds.41
The "private party" test operates with relative ease in the context of
FGOCs since almost all transactions that are carried out by FGOCs could
be carried out by private parties. The irony of this test as applied to FGOCs
is that since most FGOCs are engaging in commerce as corporations and
not as sovereigns, without the foreign government majority ownership, a
FGOC would be like any other corporation -- essentially a private party.
Thus, the test is almost always fulfilled when a suit is brought on a FGOC
claiming sovereign immunity.
B. Jurisdictional Nexus Requirements
The commercial activities exception is broken down into three clauses,
each identifying an act that is sufficiently connected to the U.S. to fulfill the
jurisdictional nexus requirement. 2 All three clauses require that the cause
of action be "based upon" a certain act or activity of a foreign state, in other
words the act or activity must form the basis of at least some element of the
cause of action.43
The first clause allows jurisdiction when the cause of action is based
upon a foreign state's commercial activity carried on in the United States.
The FSIA defines the phrase "commercial activity carried on in the United
States" as "commercial activity carried on by a (foreign) state and having
substantial contact with the United States." Jurisdiction under this clause
may be based on an activity carried on only partially in the United States.
The second clause provides for jurisdiction based on "an act performed
in the United States in connection with a commercial activity elsewhere."
Congress intended a situation involving "conduct of the foreign state in the
United States which relates either to a regular course of commercial con-
duct elsewhere or to a particular commercial transaction concluded or car-
ried out in part elsewhere." Since the second clause is very similar to the




42The FSIA only establishes subject matter jurisdiction. A plaintiff must still satisfy the
"minimum contacts" test to establish personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has declined
to hold that the "direct effects" requirement of the third clause of the commercial activities
exception incorporates the "minimum contacts" test. See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 619-20. In
some cases, personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction are easily found together.
See Hanil Bank v. P.T. Negara, 148 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 1998).43Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 356-58 (1993).
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The third clause allows U.S. courts to assert jurisdiction over a foreign
state when the cause of action is based "upon an act outside.. .the United
States in connection with a commercial activity.. .(that) causes a direct ef-
fect in the United States." Thus, both the act and the commercial activity
can be outside the United States as long as there is a direct effect in the
United States. The direct effect provision is addressed in the next subsec-
tion.
In Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, the U.S. Supreme Court defined the limits
of the commercial activities exception. In 1983, agents of Saudi Arabia re-
cruited and hired plaintiff Scott Nelson in the United States to monitor the
safety of facilities and equipment at the King Faisal Specialist Hospital in
Saudi Arabia." Nelson alleged that in performing his duties at the hospital,
he reported safety violations to a Saudi Arabian investigative commission,
and that in retaliation, Saudi officials imprisoned him for thirty-nine days
and tortured him. Nelson brought suit in the United States. The district
court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction concluding
that Nelson's claims were not based upon Saudi Arabia's commercial ac-
tivities within the United States. The Eleventh Circuit reversed but the Su-
preme Court affirmed the decision of the district court.
The Supreme Court held that the torture acts committed by Saudi Ara-
bia were not based uRon a commercial activity -- the recruitment and em-
ployment of Nelson. The court held that the "based upon" test required
something "more than a mere connection with, or relation to, commercial
activity.'"6 Courts have interpreted this "based upon" test as those elements
of a claim that if proven, would entitle a plaintiff a relief under that claim.
Thus, a court has subject-matter jurisdiction over any claims made by a
plaintiff in which the elements of the claim require proof of an FGOC's
commercial activity in the United States.47 For example in Nazarian v.
Compagnie Nationale Air France, two Iranian passengers on an Air France
flight were subjected to severe mistreatment by French authorities during a
stopover in Paris, France. The passengers sued Air France under theories of
negligence, false imprisonment, false arrest and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Air France is a "foreign state" under the FSIA because
the majority of its shares are owned by the Republic of France. The court
held that a claim of negligence would require proof of a cognizable duty of
care.48 By selling its tickets in New York, Air France created a duty of rea-
sonable care in providing safe passage. Thus, the court held that only the
negligence action may sustain subject-matter jurisdiction under the FSIA
4Id. at 351.
45 1d. at 358.
461d.
47Nazarian v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 989 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).48Nazarian, 989 F. Supp. at 509.
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because it requires proof of an element that is based upon a commercial ac-
tivity in the United States.
49
Thus, with its decision in Nelson, the Supreme Court narrowed the ap-
plication of the first clause of the commercial activities exception.50 De-
spite this limitation, the circuit courts have liberally interpreted other
language of the commercial activities exception as discussed in the next
section.
C. Direct Effect Under the Third Clause
The Supreme Court's decision in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover
had a profound effect on the definition of the "direct effect in the United
States" language of the third clause of the commercial activities exception.
Before Weltover, courts applied a "substantial and foreseeable" effect test to
interpret the direct effect language. 51 In Weltover, the Court resolved any
dispute remaining by holding that the FSIA does not contain any require-
ment of "substantial effect" or "foreseeability. 52
In the Court's opinion, "an effect is 'direct' if it follows as an [inevita-
ble and] immediate consequence of the defendant's.. .activity. 53 In Welto-
ver, several bondholders sued Argentina and its central bank in the
Southern District of New York for breach of contract. The district court
denied the motion, and the Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court
held that Argentina's unilateral rescheduling of the bond's maturity dates
had caused a direct effect in the United States.54 The Court stated that be-
cause New York was the place of performance for defendants contractual
obligations - the payment of funds to a New York bank account - the re-
scheduling of bonds necessarily had a direct effect in the United States.
55
Since the Weltover decision, federal courts have liberally interpreted the di-
rect effect provision such that the third clause has become the most litigated
clause of the commercial activities exception and also the most easily ob-
tainable for lifting sovereign immunity.
49 1d.
5°But see Elliot v. British Tourist Authority, No. 96 Civ. 9154(HB), 1997 WL 724768
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1997) (holding that the hiring and firing of a marketing executive in the
United States that works for the British Tourist Authority, an agency of the U.K., is an action
based upon a commercial activity in the United States).




55But see Transatlantic Shiffarrtskontor v. Shanghai Foreign Trade Corp., 996 F. Supp.
326, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that absent contractual obligations for the payment of
funds in the United States, no direct effect in the United States is caused).
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V. FGOCs UNDER THE COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES EXCEPTION
This section looks at the way courts have recently applied the commer-
cial activities exception to foreign government-owned corporations seeking
immunity in federal court. A number of recent decisions since the Supreme
Court's decision in Weltover have made the commercial activities exception
a much easier exception to achieve. This section looks at four recent deci-
sions by the federal courts on the commercial activities exception on
FGOCs and then argues that given these decisions, FGOCs really no longer
enjoy the sovereign immunity that it may have once had.
A. Recent Decisions on the Commercial Activities Exception for FGOCs
1. Voest-Alpine v. Bank of China, (5th Cir. 1998)
In Voest-Alpine v. Bank of China, the Fifth Circuit ruled on the appli-
cability of the commercial activities exception to the Bank of China. 6 The
Bank of China is an instrumentality of the People's Republic of China be-
cause a majority of its ownership interest is held by the Chinese govern-
ment. The Bank of China issued a letter of credit in the amount of US$1.2
million in which Voest-Alpine was the beneficiary.5 7 Due to alleged dis-
crepancies in the documents, the Bank of China refused to remit funds due
or claimed by Voest-Alpine to a designated U.S. bank account.58 Voest-
Alpine filed suit in U.S court and the Bank of China argued that it was im-
mune as a "foreign state" under the FSIA.59
The Fifth Circuit held that the third clause of the commercial activities
exception was applicable. The cause of action was based upon an act out-
side the United States in connection with the Bank of China's commercial
activity outside the United States that caused a direct effect in the United
States.60 The court held that had the Bank of China not found it necessary
to refuse payment, it would have wired money directly to Voest-Alpine's
Texas bank account. Thus, the court held that Voest-Alpine's non-receipt
of funds in its bank account caused a direct effect in the United States.6 '
Essentially, the court's holding stands for the notion that a financial loss
endured in the U.S. by an American plaintiff is sufficient to cause a direct
effect in the United States.
56Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of China, 142 F.3d 887 (5th Cir. 1998).
571d. at 890.
581d.





2. Hanil Bank v. P. T. Negara Indonesia, (2d Cir. 1998)
In Hanil Bank v. P.T. Negara Indonesia, Hanil Bank was a Korean
bank doing business in Indonesia.62 The defendant, BNI, issued a letter of
credit to Kodeco, an Indonesian manufacturer of car radios. Hanil Bank
served as the negotiating bank and it was expected that BNI would remit the
funds for the letter of credit to Hanil Bank. 3 The designated place of pay-
ment was a New York bank account. BNI refused to pay the funds and Ha-
nil Bank filed suit in the New York State Supreme Court. After removing
the action to federal court, BNI contended that it was immune from suit un-
der the FSIA.
The court found that BNI was a "foreign state" by virtue of the fact
that it was owned by the Indonesian government.64 The Second Circuit
held that the third clause of the commercial activities exception applied and
that Hanil Bank's failure to pay on a letter of credit in a New York bank ac-
count caused a direct effect in the United States.65 The court eventually
held that the commercial activities exception applied to BNI and that Hanil
Bank had jurisdiction in the breach of contract claim.66 Thus, in Hanil
Bank, a breach of contract between a Korean Bank and an Indonesian
FGOC, where the only connection to the United States was the funds of a
letter of credit that were to be deposited in a New York bank account, satis-
fied thejurisdictional nexus requirement for the commercial activities ex-
ception.
3. Adler v. Federal Republic ofNigeria, (9th Cir. 1997)
A United States citizen, Adler, contracted with the Republic of Nigeria,
the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation ("NNPC") and the Central
Bank of Nigeria.6" Both NNPC and the Central Bank qualified as "foreign
states" under the FSIA as they are owned by the Nigerian government. The
contract provided that Adler would denote a non-Nigerian bank account
into which the money owed to him would be transferred. When Nigeria
failed to pay, Adler filed suit in the United States asserting that Nigeria's
failure to pay had caused a direct effect under Weltover.69
The court ruled that Nigeria had engaged in a commercial activity by
entering into an agreement for the assignment of a contract in exchange for
62Hanil Bank v. P.T. Negara Indonesia, 148 F.3d 127, 129 (2d Cir. 1998).
631d. at 130.
6Id.
65 d. at 133.
6MId. at 134.
67See also Commercial Bank of Kuwait v. Rafidain Bank, 15 F.3d 238, 241 (2d Cir.
1994) (holding that Iraqi banks' "failure to remit funds in New York, as they were contractu-
ally bound to do, had a direct effect in the United States under Weltover").
68Adler v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 107 F.3d 720, 722 (9th Cir. 1997).691d. at 723.
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consideration.7° The court rejected the Nigerian government's argument
that the contract made was of a sovereign nature -- the right to distribute
government funds and collect government revenue.71 The court stated that
this rationale would make all government contracts sovereign in nature and
that the correct test was the "private person" test in Weltover. Furthermore,
the Court held that Nigeria's failure to make payments in a New York bank
account caused a direct effect in the United States.72 Thus, Adler shows that
even a contract that potentially involved some sovereign activity could still
be classified as a commercial activity as long as a private party could per-
form that activity.
4. Aldy v. Valmet Paper Machinery, (5th Cir. 1996)
Charles Aldy was crushed to death while working in a Vaper machine
at the Stone Container Corporation's paper mill in Louisiana.73 Aldy's wife
and daughter brought suit against Valmet Paper Machinery, the manufac-
turer of the paper machine. Valmet is a FGOC owned by the government of
Finland and operating in Finland. Valmet Machinery alleged that it was
immune from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.74
The Fifth Circuit held that the third clause of the FSIA applied to Val-
met. The Aldys' suit was based upon acts that occurred outside the United
States. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the Aldys' claim that
they satisfied the "in connection" requirements since Valmet Paper is in the
business of designing and manufacturing paper machines, and the paper
machine that killed Mr. Aldy was one manufactured by Valmet.7 5 Finally,
the Fifth Circuit concluded that a direct effect had been caused in the U.S.
since Aldy's death occurred as an immediate consequence of the defen-
dant's activity.7 6 Essentially, the court held that a death in the U.S. caused
by a product manufactured abroad was enough to satisfy the third clause of
the commercial activities exception. Aldy is different from other cases be-
cause it involves a tort claim rather than a contract claim. Furthermore un-
der Aldy, a direct effect in the United States does not have to be a financial










B. The Effect of the Commercial Activities Exception on FGOCs
As stated in Part II, it is generally easy for a FGOC to claim sovereign
immunity under the FSIA. All FGOCs will meet the definition of a "for-
eign state" if more than 50 percent of their shares are owned by a foreign
government. Furthermore, ownership of a corporation can be pooled to-
gether to achieve a majority ownership interest and a "foreign state" status.
Finally, indirect ownership by a country or several countries through agen-
cies or instrumentalities still allow sovereign immunity to apply. It would
seem that all FGOCs then would be immune from suits in U.S. courts given
the ease in which courts have allowed "foreign state" status to be conferred.
Also, by virtue of obtaining a foreign state recognition, the burden then
shifts to the plaintiff to establish an exception to the immunity.
However, the general trend seems to be that suits are not barred against
FGOCs because of the ease in obtaining jurisdiction under the commercial
activities exception. As stated in Part IV, there are three clauses to the ex-
ception that can be applied to a FGOC: (1) where a commercial activity has
been carried out in the U.S.; (2) where the act in the U.S. is in connection
with a commercial activity of a foreign state elsewhere; (3) where the act
and commercial activity are outside the United States but the act causes a
direct effect in the U.S.
A "commercial activity" is defined as virtually anything a private party
can accomplish on its own -- corporations almost always fit this description.
There are very few activities a corporation can do that involve sovereign
governmental activities. Where FGOCs have attempted to invoke that ar-
gument it has failed, as in Adler. Most transactions carried out by a FGOC
can easily be done by a corporation that is not owned by a foreign govern-
ment. In fact, one can argue that the inherent purpose of a corporation is to
carry out a commercial activity.
The "in connection with" requirement has also been liberally defined
to involve any causal connection between an act and a commercial activity
in most cases. Finally, under the third clause of the commercial activities
exception, a "direct effect" caused in the United States is anything of im-
mediate consequence of the commercial activity. Thus, in Voest-Alpine,
failure to remit funds to a U.S. bank account was enough.77 In Hanil Bank,
the entire act and commercial activity was outside the U.S., but since funds
were to be deposited in a New York bank account, that proved enough for
the court even though New York may not have been the final destination of
the funds. In Aldy, a paper machine manufactured in Finland but which
caused a death in the U.S. was also enough to satisfy the direct effect provi-
sion.!
77Voest-Alpine, 142 F.3d at 894.78Aldy, 74 F.3d at 75.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 20:181 (1999)
Thus, after the rejection in Weltover of a "substantial and foreseeable"
test by the Supreme Court, the circuit courts have liberally interpreted the
direct effect requirement as essentially any remote harm that may occur in
the United States even if it involves the non-deposit of funds in a U.S. bank
account. The effect of this ease in obtaining the commercial activities ex-
ception on U.S. businesses will be discussed later.
It should be noted that there are decisions where courts have decided
that the application of the commercial activities exception is so far remote
that they have denied jurisdiction over FGOCs. Although it has been ar-
gued that the exception is easy to obtain, granting the exception in some
cases would be absurd and some courts have recognized this fact. In
Nordmann v. Thai Airways Int'l., Ltd., the Ninth Circuit rejected the argu-
ment that Thai Airways, a FGOC, fell within the commercial activities ex-
ception.79 The appellants argued that Thai Airways' acceptance of payment
through use of a credit card which was issued by a bank located in the
United States and claim for payment against the bank constituted a direct
effect of the Thai Airways' crash. 0
The court held that Thai Airways' acceptance of payment was not a di-
rect effect of the plane crash but rather the acceptance of payment was a di-
rect effect of the purchase."1 Thus, the court found, under Nelson, that the
act upon which the action was based did not cause a direct effect in the
United States.
Furthermore, in Randolph v. Budget Rent-A-Car, a student trainee on a
scholarship from Saudi Arabia took a trip away from his Texas school to
California at his own expense.82 While there, he negligently drove a pri-
vately-rented vehicle and injured a motorcyclist. The Ninth Circuit held
that "the specific acts of which the plaintiff complains did not arise out of
Saudi's commercial activity (providing a scholarship) in the United
States."
8 3
Finally, in Pere v. Nuovo Pignone, Inc., Nuovo Pigone was an Italian
government-owned corporation (through tiering) that designed and manu-
84factured turbine systems. ' The turbines were sent to a corporation in the
United States for testing, and Pere was killed during this testing.85 Pere's
survivors sued and Nuovo claimed sovereign immunity. The Fifth Circuit
refused to apply the commercial activities exception to Nuovo finding that
there was no material connection between Nuovo's commercial activity and
the wrongful death of Pere. Unlike Aldy, the important prong in Pere was
79Nordmann v. Thai Airways Int'l., Ltd., 112 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1997).
80 1d.81Id. at 518.
82Randolph v. Budget Rent-a-Car, 97 F.3d 319, 323 (9th Cir. 1996).
831d. at 324.




the "in connection with" language of the FSIA. The court found that once
the components were delivered in the United States, consultation between
Nuovo and the U.S. corporation doing the testing ceased 6 Thus, the court
held that the "in connection with" requirement of the second clause did not
apply.
Although there has been a liberal application of the elements of the
commercial activities exception, courts have drawn lines to prevent suits
with remote connection with the United States from being litigated in fed-
eral court as in Nordmann, Randolph and Pere.8 7 However, there are only a
limited number of cases where the commercial activities exception has not
been applied in U.S. case law.
VI. THE EFFECTS OF THE FSIA FOR U.S. BUSINESSES
A. Uncertainty in Transactions
While this paper argues that the commercial activities exception in
most cases easily lifts the sovereign immunity of a FGOC, the initial grant
of immunity on FGOCs can cause some uncertainty for U.S. businesses.
Plaintiffs often find out too late that the corporation with whom they have
transacted enjoys a special status."8 Usually, the identity of the corporation
as a "foreign state" is unknown to a U.S. business dealing with a foreign
corporation, especially if the foreign state status is conferred by majority
ownership.89 American businesses may not have access to a foreign corpo-
ration's corporate ownership shareholder information. Also, the foreign
corporation may not wish to reveal to a U.S. business its corporate owner-
ship structure. A corporation's name, such as Valmet Paper Machinery,
does not reflect that the corporation is owned by a foreign state. Moreover,
many U.S. businesses may not be aware of the FSIA and the fact that a
FGOC could be immune from suit in the U.S. if a breach of contract occurs.
B. Procedural Burdens of the FSIA
There are a number of cumbersome procedural burdens that the FSIA
and the commercial exceptions confers upon the plaintiff and defendant.
S6Id. at 482.
"See also Montanez v. Banco Progresso Int'l de Puerto Rico, 973 F. Supp. 89, 94
(D.P.R. 1997) (holding that the acquisition of private banking corporations by a semi-
autonomous governmental agency pursuant to emergency efforts to alleviate a nationwide
banking crisis is not a commercial activity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).
88See, e.g., O'Connell Mach.,Co. v. M.V. "Americana", 566 F. Supp. 1381, 1383
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (fact that Italian Line was a shipping company "indirectly owned" by Ital-
ian state enterprise FINMARE was disclosed to plaintiff several weeks after complaint was
filed).
89See Hoffman, supra note 15, at 567.
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The FSIA provides for a shifting burden of proof on the establishment of
immunity.
The entity sued must first show that it is a "foreign state" under Section
1603.90 The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show an applicable excep-
tion to the general rule of immunity. Thus, the plaintiff has the burden to
show that the commercial activities exception is applicable. However, the
ultimate burden is on the state to prove that the exception is inapplicable.9'
Thus, the plaintiff and defendant are thrust into a labyrinth of shifting bur-
dens of proof under the FSIA. This forces a plaintiff to prove an exception
to the sovereign immunity of a FGOC which can cause a great degree of
uncertainty for U.S. businesses. Furthermore, in most cases, there is no de-
bate about whether a corporation is foreign government-owned since all that
is required is a majority (over 50 percent) of ownership by the foreign gov-
ernment. Thus, the presumption remains strong that a FGOC will have
sovereign immunity and the burden is on the plaintiff to prove an exception.
C. Precautions for U.S. Businesses
There are a number of precautions that U.S. businesses can take to
avoid being faced with a sovereign immunity defense from a FGOC and
having to argue an exception to the FSIA. These exceptions require that the
U.S. business have knowledge that (a) the foreign corporation involved in
the transaction is owned by a foreign government, and (b) that an FGOC is
entitled to immunity under the FSIA. As stated above, the former will pose
a difficulty in some circumstances while the latter just requires good law-
yering.
A U.S. business should specifically ask for the identity of the owners
of the corporation. More preferable is to ask for the ownership hierarchy
given the fact that pooling is allowed between several states. However,
even with knowledge of the owners of the shares of the foreign corporation,
a U.S. business should investigate further back into the chain of ownership
given that tiering is allowed in some circuits.
A U.S. business involved in a transaction with a FGOC should struc-
ture that transaction so that it has some connection with the United States to
satisfy the "in connection with" requirement of the second clause. As stated
in Part IV, a non-U.S. business should structure a transaction so that the
remittance of funds occurs in a United States bank account. This factor
satisfies the jurisdictional nexus of the 'direct effect" test of the third clause
of the commercial activities exception. This is true even if the U.S. bank
account is not the final destination of the funds. The deposit of funds in the
901d.; see also Joseph v. Office of the Consulate Gen. of Nig., 830 F.2d 1018, 1021 (9th
Cir. 1987); Meadows v. Dominican Republic, 817 F.2d 517, 522 (9th Cir. 1987); Alberti v.
Empresa Nicaraguense de ]a Came, 705 F.2d 250, 255-56 (7th Cir. 1983).
91Hoffman, supra note 15.
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United States seems to be the safest way of structuring a transaction so that
the commercial activities exception will be satisfied.
U.S. businesses may also ask for an explicit waiver of the immunity of
a foreign state by a specific provision in the contract during the negotiation
of a transaction. The FSIA provides for this explicit waiver of immunity
and explicit waivers have never been the subject of judicial scrutiny.92 A
FGOC may also impliedly have waived its sovereign immunity although
this has been the source of much debate. Most courts have construed the
implied waiver exception narrowly and have generally declined to go be-
yond Congress's list of examples of implied waiver in the Act's legislative
history. These examples include: (1) cases in which foreign states agree to
arbitration in the United States, (2) cases in which foreign states agree that
the law of the United States should govern and (3) cases in which a foreign
state has filed a responsive pleading in an action without raising the defense
of sovereign immunity. Courts have usually required some evidence that
the foreign state has intended to waive its immunity under the FSIA before
they find that the foreign state has impliedly done so.
93
VII. GETTING RID OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FOR FGOCs.
No other country in the world has adopted state ownership as a basis
for conferring sovereign legal status on commercial corporations. 94 Since
1976, most jurisdictions that have codified the restrictive theory have ex-
pressly rejected the idea, choosing to codify the separate entity rule.9s Sec-
tion 1603(b) is directly contrary to the international practice of conferring
sovereign immunity.
Under current law, entities with separate legal personality enjoy a "pre-
sumption of independent status" for purposes of liability.96 Separate enti-
ties cannot be held liable for obligations of a foreign state (or another
separate entity) unless the court finds an alter ego relationship exists be-
tween the tWo. 9 7 For immunity purposes, Section 1603(b) confers sover-
92id.
9 3 See Pere, 150 F.3d at 482 (holding that Nuovo Pigone did not impliedly waive its sov-
ereign immunity when it agreed in the contract that the laws of Texas would govern the per-
formance or execution of the contract; implied waiver must be construed narrowly).
94Hoffman, supra note 15.
95Id.
"See First Nat'l Bank v. Banco Para El Comercia Exterior de Cuba (Bancec), 462 U.S.
611, 629 (1983).
97See id. (stating that the elements of an "alter ego" doctrine is "where a corporate entity
is so extensively controlled by its owner that a relationship of principle and agent is created,
we have held that one may be held liable for the actions of the other. In addition, our cases
have long recognized 'the broader equitable principle that the doctrine of corporate entity,
recognized generally and for most purposes, will not be regarded when to do so would work
fraud or injustice."); see also Hester Int.l Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nig., 879 F.2d 170,
181 (5th Cir. 1989).
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eign immunity over an FGOC as it was the state itself. However, for liabil-
ity purposes, that same entity can claim it is separate from the state to such
a degree that it cannot be identified with the state. Thus, there is a great in-
consistency associated with Section 1603(b) in relation to the separate en-
tity rule.
The purpose of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity as stated in
Part II is to prevent conferring sovereign immunity on a foreign state for
their commercial activities. However, even the initial grant of sovereign
immunity to a FGOC, which by nature, as a corporation, is almost always
engaged in commercial activities, runs contrary to the very purpose of re-
strictive sovereign immunity. Thus, there is an inherent contradiction in
granting an FGOC sovereign immunity.
Furthermore, current FSIA case law runs contrary to the very purpose
of sovereign immunity. A number of circuits allow pooling and tiering of
the ownership structure. Under pooling, a corporation owned by numerous
countries can satisfy the presumption of immunity. However, the very pur-
pose of sovereign immunity is to prevent jurisdiction over one country and
its entities in U.S. courts. Allowing pooling of corporations has opened up
sovereign immunity to a large number of multinational corporations and
countries. Ten countries could own a 5 percent share in a corporation with
the eleventh country owning a 1 percent share, and that corporation would
be presumed immune from suit until an exception is invoked. Under tier-
ing, a corporation could be owned by an agency of an agency of a state
government. As the Ninth Circuit pointed out in Aldy, this could lead to
immunity for every subsidiary in a corporate chain. Granting immunity
even when the government is separated by five links in the chain of owner-
ship also destroys the very purpose of sovereign immunity. Thus, pooling
and tiering lead to absurd conclusions and both doctrines should be dis-
carded.
As stated above, the granting of immunity under the FSIA causes a
great deal of confusion and contradiction. However, that confusion is
heightened by the fact that sovereign immunity is almost never sustained on
a FGOC because the commercial activities exception is almost always ap-
plicable. The definition of a commercial activity in Weltover is anything a
private person can accomplish. Thus, corporations fall nicely within this
definition. The "direct effect" test in the third clause of the FSIA has a
broad definition that is easy to meet as evidenced in Voest-Alpine, Hanil
Bank, Adler, and Aldy. Thus, even though a FGOC initially gets immunity,
it soon loses it under the commercial activities exception.
Moreover, the very potential of immunity from suit on a FGOC causes
a great degree of uncertainty for U.S. and foreign businesses, and requires
them to take extra precautions. The FSIA hurls them into a labyrinth of
shifting burdens when suit has been filed. Also, the FSIA grants jurisdic-
tion to FGOCs with very remote connections to the United States. FGOCs
structuring their transactions to involve the deposit of funds in a U.S. bank
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account could very well find themselves sued in a U.S. court. U.S. federal
courts could become a forum for foreign countries to litigate their claims.
This could lead to a great burden on many federal court dockets.
Given the confusion and absurdity caused by the FSIA, FGOCs should
be removed from the definition of a foreign state under Section 1603(b).
Before the FSIA was enacted, FGOCs were not granted sovereign immunity
and this policy should have been maintained. There is no reason why a
commercial entity owned by a government but engaging in private com-
mercial transactions should be initially granted immunity. Furthermore,
there is no reason why a plaintiff in a lawsuit should bear the burden of
proving an exception. At the very least, if there should be a FGOC that is
involved in sovereign activities, U.S. law should allow the defendant to
have the option of proving that it is engaged in a sovereign function and re-
quire the defendant to bear the burden of proof. The defendant will thus
bear the burden of showing a non-commercial function and of proving that
its acts are within the scope of a sovereign function. In this case, the "pri-
vate party" test from Weltover can still be used because FGOCs involved in
private person activities will not be able to meet the burden of showing sov-
ereign activities. This option will be more in line with the doctrine of re-
strictive immunity, it will rid the procedural burden shifting that a U.S.
business must bear and it will provide a degree of confidence to U.S. busi-
nesses that their claims can be adjudicated in U.S. courts.
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